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Abstract 
 
Ownership structure is known as the distribution of equity with relation to votes, 
capital and the identity of equity owners (Holderness et al., 1999). Ownership 
structure served as an important element in corporate governance by influencing the 
type of incentives managers receives from the firm. This paper reviews recent studies 
on the effect of ownership structure on banking efficiency in the developing countries 
with the focus on ASEAN countries. Review of previous studies clearly indicates that 
types of ownerships did exert some influences towards the performance of the banks 
in terms of efficiency. Even though publicly-owned banks operated in an 
economically inefficiency environment, it is undeniable that the existence of 
publicly-owned banks are needed especially in economically less stable countries. 
This is because the government-owned banks or the state-owned banks can act as a 
catalyst to ensure the development of certain priority sectors that are believed to 
contribute to the long run economic growth of the countries. Besides that, the 
existence of state-owned banks and government-ownership is crucial for the 
countries to have a balance social and economic objective. In addition, countries need 
to encourage the entry for foreign participants into the banking sectors to improve the 
quality and availability of the financial services towards the domestic financial 
market (Levine, 1996). The entry will encourage domestic banks to compete more 
efficiently in terms of costs and profits in order to survive in this environment. The 
spillover effects in terms of technology brought by the foreign participant will enable 
the creation of a more modern banking environment in the host countries. Not only 
that, with a balance combination of state-, privately-, and foreign-owned banks, it is 
believed that the banking industry in the developing countries will be able to survive 
in the competitive environment while helping the government effectively implement 
the macroeconomics policies in the long run.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ownership structure is known as the distribution of equity with relation to 
voting rights, capital and  the identity of equity owners (Holderness et al., 1999). 
Ownership structure served as an important element in the corporate governance 
because they will affect the managers’ performance by influencing the type of 
incentives receives from the firm. The classical theory of managerial firm highlighted 
that the management-controlled firm exhibit different results as compared to owner-
controlled firm due to the differences in the interest between managers and owners 
[Baumol (1959), Galbraith (1967), Marris (1964), and Williamson (1964)]. The main 
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objective of the owners is to maximize the market value of the share of the firms 
while the managers choose to maximize utility in terms of power, security, status and 
income.  
On the other hand, the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1979) states 
that  ownership structure served as a part of firm’s production function, technology, 
and productive resources in determining the efficiency and possibilities of survival of 
different organization forms. Therefore, types of ownership structure are crucial in 
determining firm efficiency level especially in the banking industry. This is due to the 
fact that this industry is always characterized with the complexity due to information 
asymmetries and highly regulated by the regulatory authority as pointed out by Barth 
et al. (2004). Hence, it is crucial to determine the most suitable types of ownership 
structure in governing the banks performance of a particular country in order to avoid  
agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983a) and also to serve as a guideline for the 
policies implementation such as the act of privatization in boosting the firms’ 
performance and the economy as a whole.  
The ownership structure in the banking industry can be generally divided into 
public, private, and foreign ownership. Out of these structures, the ownership of the 
banks can also be broadly divided into dispersed and concentrated ownership based 
on the amount of shareholdings of the inside and outside shareholders. Up to date, 
many studies had been done in terms of the effect of ownership structure towards the 
performance of the banks especially on the area of corporate governance, namely the 
effect of insider and outside shareholders of the banks and the banks’ performance. 
Nevertheless, there are still lacks of studies on the types of ownership structure in 
terms of publicly-owned, privately-owned and also foreign-owned banks [ Among the 
studies done are documented in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Buch (1997), Barth et al. 
(2004), Megginson (2005), Boubakri et al. (2005), Bonin et al. (2005a), Choi and 
Hasan (2005), Mohielding and Nasr (2007)]. Furthermore, studies on the effects of 
ownership structure towards the banking efficiency especially in the developing 
countries and the Asian in general are still inconclusive and need further attention 
especially when dealing with publicly-owned banks and privately-owned banks. 
There are still questions on the existence of government-owned banks in helping the 
development of an economy especially in the developing countries and Asian 
countries which mainly focus on the small and medium size enterprises. This served 
as the main justification of the existence of government-owned banks to ensure that 
the banking industry will not be dominated by foreign-owned banks in order to 
facilitate the credit allocation of the government to the small and medium size 
enterprises as well as the priority sectors in the developing countries (Vernon, 1979).  
Hence, this paper reviews recent studies on ownership structure effect on 
banking efficiency in the developing countries to provide an insight for the best 
combination of ownership structures in the developing countries with the focus on 
ASEAN countries.  
Section 2 reviews theoretically the roles played by different types of 
ownership structure towards the performance of a country’s banking industry. Section 
3 and 4 then review the studies of types of ownership structure by focusing on the 
effect of public-, private-, and foreign-owned banks towards banking efficiency in the 
developing countries in Section 3 and 4. Section 5  present some statistics on the types 
of banking ownership structure in the ASEAN-5. Finally, Section 6 provides some 
implications of the ownership structures on bank efficiency  in the ASEAN-5 
countries.   
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2. Ownership Structure and Banks’ Performance 
The ownerships of the firm are broadly divided into six categories, namely the 
personal or family majority ownership, dispersed ownership, dominant minority 
ownership, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, government ownerships, and 
cooperatives (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1998) 
Personal or family majority ownership refers to a person or a family owns a 
majority voting rights of the company. Hart (1988) pointed out that it is best to 
transfer the residual rights of control to the manager of an activity because the 
manager would have better access to the information as compare to the outside 
owners based on their involvement in the daily operation of the firm. Therefore, 
personal, and managerial ownership is crucial to curb information asymmetries 
between the company managers and outside owners.  
Foreign ownership is defined when foreigners owns a voting majority of the 
company. This kind of ownership structure is mainly found in the research 
development-intensive industries with large economies of scale. This is mainly due to 
the policies of the government to encourage foreign investment to bring in the new 
technology into a particular sector such as the manufacturing sector and banking 
sector in order to develop the activities in these sectors. 
Public ownership refers when the local or national government owns the 
majority voting of the company. It is mainly meant to overcome market characterized 
with market failures such as monopoly power, externalities, or large economies of 
scale (Shepherd, 1989). 
The other type of ownership structure is cooperatives in which the company 
registered as a cooperative and normally available in the agricultural sector 
characterized by low income earning. This type of arrangement helps the farmers to 
increase their earnings by lowering the input prices and reduce the supply to the end 
market (Tirole, 1992).  
 
Concentration of Ownership 
The forms of concentration take place in terms of large shareholders, 
takeovers, and large creditors. The concentrated ownership exhibits superior in 
monitoring the managers’ performance in maximizing the shareholder value. It is 
believed that the higher concentration or large shareholders resulted in substantial 
voting control that exert pressure on the management or even to drive out the 
management through fight or takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Hence, large 
shareholders are manipulated to address the agency problem since they have enough 
control over the assets of the firm. Besides that, they also served as the sources of 
external financing for the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
Nevertheless, according to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) large shareholders are 
not diversified and ended up bearing excessive risk. Moreover, large shareholders 
might result in conflict of interest between the firms, employees and managers when 
they pursued their own interest at the expense of other investors and employees. 
Hence, it might not serve as the best way to curb the agency problem and increase  
firm performance. Furthermore, the performance of the firms also depends on the 
share owned by the outside shareholders and inside shareholders.  
 
Inside versus outside shareholders 
The managers choose to maximize utility in terms of power, security, status 
and income and therefore they act to harm the benefits of the shareholders in the 
firms. This eventually affects the firms’ performance since the managers pursue their 
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own self-interest to maximize utility.  Hence, it is argued that incentives should be 
given to the manager so that they will adopt investment and financing policies in line 
with the managers and owners’ benefits. However, this will reduce the payoff to 
outside stockholders as the incentives will reduce as the portion of ownership 
increases by making the managers a part of the shareholders. 
According to the theory of firm, Alchian and Demsetz (1972), partnerships 
create free-rider problems which resulted in the undersupply of productive inputs. 
Even by providing the managers with the shares of the companies it is believed that 
the managers who are also known as the insider shareholders will augment the cash 
flow of the firms by consuming additional non-marketable resources. Therefore, it is 
vital for the outsiders to solve the distributional of conflict by monitor the activities of 
the insiders (Muller and Warneryd, 2001). This justified the existence of outside 
ownerships or shareholders in the firms in order to increase the firms’ performance. 
In this case, outsiders which priority is the residual claims on the firms’ 
earnings will force the insiders to distribute the produced surplus by provide evidence 
that the existence of the surplus. Furthermore, the outsider acts as the catalyst to 
correct the incentives with their entitlement to the firm’s residual income. In 
equilibrium, the outsiders is said to be able to extract at least part of the surplus due to 
their right for residual claimant, therefore, less resources will be wasted due to the 
distributional conflict between the insiders. 
Nevertheless, the proper percentage of shareholding are largely depends on the 
nature of the firms and therefore, it is crucial to study the firms’ structure in terms of 
government-owned, privately-owned and foreign-owned. 
 
Public versus private ownership 
Economic theory states that institutions exist when it is efficient to do so that 
is when the social benefits of building the institutions exceed the transaction costs 
(Demsetz, 1967). Therefore, the government involves in the corporate governance of 
the firms in order to enhance the efficiency of the firms.  The government 
involvement in governing the operations of a particular institution can be broadly 
divided into public interest theory and political interest theory. 
Public interest theory claims that the institutions are developed based on  
public interests and the costs of maintaining the institutions are borne by the public 
(Pigou, 1920). Thus, the existence of market failures, negative externalities, and 
distributional issues are believed to hurt the public interest.  Consequently, politician 
comes into the picture to improve the efficiency in the market by controlling the 
decisions of firms in order to maximize the social welfare, and improve on the 
decisions of private enterprises when monopoly power or externalities exert the 
divergence between private and social objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).  
According to Stiglitz (1989) market failures are usually found in less-
developed economies. In the banking sector, the government is expected to take the 
leading role in ensuring that the national industry will not be dominated by foreign-
owned enterprises. This is because government is able to assume larger risks as 
compared with private institution as well as to provide capital on the favorable terms 
to the banking industry (Vernon, 1979). Hence, it is undeniable that the role played by 
the government in banking sector of the developing countries is still pronounce and 
vital by enforcing direct regulation and comprehensive explicit deposit insurance in 
promoting the efficiency in the banking industry. Therefore, the state-owned banks 
played an important role to boost the economy in these countries.  
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Consequently, the public interest theory conform to the development views in 
which, government ownership is crucial to stimulate  economic growth of the country. 
This is because the privately-owned banks are not fully developed in the economic 
institutions and thus unable to meet with the financing needs (Mohielding and Nasr, 
2007). Therefore, the development of state-owned banks served as a catalyst to 
provide funding for the businesses in developing the economy of these countries. 
Bichsel and Spielmann (2004) pointed out that the state-owned enterprises are more 
consumer-friendly pricing and they are able to reduce the competing profit 
maximizing firm’s ability to extract consumer surplus and hence reduce their 
monopoly power. However, cross-country experience pointed out that the need to 
achieve the government policy objectives had eventually affected the performance of 
the state-owned banks.  
On the other hand, the political interest theory suggests that institutions are 
created for the benefit of the politicians and to facilitate the control of those in power. 
In this context, the cost is borne by the politician (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The political view states that the state-owned banks are 
forced to pursue non-economic objectives such as maintaining excess employment, 
engaging in subsidies such as building factories in politically desirable locations and 
other benefits for social as well as political stability such as pricing output at below 
market clearing prices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Therefore, the political interest 
theory is focus on wealth redistribution rather than efficiency by controlling the assets 
and converts them into wealth (Marx, 1982; Olson, 1993).  
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also highlighted that the economist 
view on the public enterprises in curing the market failures failed to work as the firms 
are highly inefficient due to political pressures as well as the pursuance of the 
politicians’ interests which provide employment, subsidies, and other benefits to 
supporters to encourage votes. Besides that, the firms also produce goods desired by 
the politicians rather than consumers as well as charge prices significantly below 
marginal cost in order to win the political support from the public. Thus, this had 
created an impair ability for the state-owned banks to operate on the commercial 
terms because it had to financed the government policy objectives hence, distorting  
resources from profit maximization and led to inefficiencies in term of the overall 
operations of the banks. In addition, the protection given to state-owned banks by the 
government has created a culture in which managers are less diligent in maximizing 
revenues and minimizing the costs of the banks as a whole (Megginson, 2005). As a 
result, the state-owned banks are usually characterized with lower profit.  
In this era of liberalization and globalization, countries tend to move towards 
privatization of the banking sector in order to boost the efficiency of the banking 
industry in order to equip them to compete with the foreign counterparts. Kemal 
(2000) pointed out that the privatization process is used to foster competition, 
ensuring greater capital investment, competitiveness, and modernization when the 
government-owned firms failed to work. This is because privatization replaces the 
political control by concentrate on private cash flow ownership with the creation of 
more efficient ownership structure (Megginson et al., 1994).  This eventually helps to 
develop factor and product markets as well as security markets due to greater 
competition level. In addition, it helps the government by reduce fiscal deficit with 
the sales of state-owned enterprises.  
However, as pointed out by Boubakri et al. (2005), if the privatization turned 
out to be a failure this will create loss to depositors and a liability to the tax payers 
and consequently lead to banking crisis in the particular country. According to the 
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welfare theory, the effect of privatization depends on the degree of market failure and 
thus a careful choice of policy for privatization should be done in order to boost the 
competition and efficiency of the banking sector (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
Therefore, further analysis need to be done before the government decided to 
privatize the bank. This is because the ownership structure of the banks and their 
institutional roles in the national economy served as a crucial variable in the process 
of financial deepening and economy growth (Levine, 1997). 
 
Foreign ownership 
In addition to government ownership and private ownership of the banks, the 
role of foreign ownership in the banking sector also played an important role as a 
catalyst to the domestic banking sector to operate efficiently and indirectly 
contributed to the development of the economy as a whole. Most studies, among 
others, Buch 1997, Bonin et al. (2005a), as well as Choi and Hasan (2005) highlighted 
the important role played by the foreign counterparts in boosting the banking sector of 
the host country. 
According to Buch (1997),  foreign investors brought in better technology and 
human capital to the domestic banks. This is because foreign-owned banks normally 
rely on the advancement of the modern technology and human capital from their 
parent banks which are believed to operate better than the domestic government-
owned or privately-owned banks (Bonin et al., 2005a). Brimmer, and Dahl (1975), 
Fieleke (1977), Allen and Giddy (1979), Khoury (1980), Goldberg and Saunders 
(1986), and Giddy (1983) also argued that the foreign banks contributed different kind 
of entrepreneurial resources such as technology, organizational and marketing 
knowledge as well as commercial intelligent to the domestic banks. Therefore, foreign 
investment in the domestic banking industry will helps boost the efficiency of the 
domestic banks in general because the domestic banks able to learn from the foreign 
counterpart in order to further develop themselves to compete with the foreign banks 
and to sustain in the competitive environment. Furthermore, as pointed out by 
Mathieson and Schinasi (2000), greater foreign participants will contributes to a more 
stable banking system and a less volatile supply of credit if the parent bank has a 
strong financial position and committed to the medium-term strategy in strengthening 
the local market position. 
Nevertheless, the contribution and the important roles played by the foreign-
owned banks in the domestic banking sector especially in the developing countries are 
unclear because most of the foreign-owned banks practiced cherry-pick creditworthy 
customer. In this context, most of the lending was channeled out to the households 
rather than to the small and medium-sized enterprises. This practice will make it 
difficult for the priority sector to get funding from the foreign-owned banks and 
eventually deteriorate the economy of the developing country with the main objective 
to develop the small and medium-sized industry if the banking system is dominated 
by foreign-owned banks. 
 
3. Review of Empirical Studies 
Public versus private  ownership and bank efficiency 
The literature on public versus private ownership effect on bank performance 
still give inconclusive results. Cornett et al. (2000) examined the performance 
differences between privately-owned and publicly-owned banks in five selected 
countries in Asia, namely South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand from 1994 to 997. The results of the analysis indicates that publicly-own 
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banks are relatively inferior in terms of their performance and it worsens during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. Similarly,  Karim’s (2003) study on Malaysian banking 
found that publicly-own banks are less efficient than private banks. 
Similar results are result also found by Matousek and Taci (2002) in their 
study of the banking industry in Czech Republic from 1993 to 1998, Isik and Hassan 
(2002) on Turkish banking, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) on Indian banking, and 
Micco et. Al. (2007) on both developing and industrial countries. 
On the other hand, there are quite a number of studies that found otherwise. 
Study by Zaim (1995) on Turkish commercial banks found that in 1990, the state-
owned banks performed better than the privately-owned and foreign-owned banks and 
this had been supported by following study by Yildirim (2002). Other studies that 
found similar results are Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) on Indian banking, Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998)  on  Croatian banking during the period of 1994 to 1995, Isik and 
Hassan (2003), Boubakri et al. (2005) also found that state-owned banks to be more 
efficient in 22 developing countries under analysis from 1986 to 1998. 
 
Foreign versus local-own banks 
Studies on foreign entry towards the domestic banks mostly found a positive 
impact towards banking efficiency. Denizer (1999) studied on the effect of foreign 
entry on the Turkish banks found that foreign entry reduced the domestic bank in 
terms of profitability and overhead expenses which are the signal for improvement in 
efficiency. This results is supported by Hao et al. (2001) on the productive efficiency 
of 19 Korean banks from 1985 to 1995 which also found that on average, banking 
efficiency is positively correlated with foreign entry ownership.  
Claessans et al. (2001) compares the  performance between domestic and 
foreign banks in 80 countries both in developed and developing economy from 1988 
to 1995. The conclusion obtained in his study is similar to Denizer (1999) in that 
foreign entry reduced the profitability and overhead expenses of domestic banks and 
thus lead to improvement in efficiency in the domestic banks. The results conclude 
that foreign entry contributed to increase efficiency of national banking market and 
hence create positive welfare implications towards the domestic economy. 
Drakos (2003) study on the performance of banks in 11 transitions countries in 
1993 to 1999 found that foreign entry increases the performance of the banking sector 
in terms of net interest margin. Chantapong (2005) found that the foreign participants 
in the banking industry seem to improve the domestic banks performance in terms of 
cost efficiency. Similar results is also found by Williams and Nguyen (2005) study in 
the South East Asia region.  
However, Unite and Sullivan (2002) study  on commercial banks from 1990 to 
1998 found that the entry of foreign banks in the Philippines banking industry  
increase the  operating expenses of banking system in the country.  
Comparison between the efficiency of foreign-owned banks and domestic 
banks is performed by Jemric and Vujcic (2002). They found that foreign-owned 
banks appear to be more efficient. The results is also supported by  Weill (2003) on 
banks in Czech Republic and Poland in 1997 in which foreign-owned banks were 
found to be more efficient than the domestic banks, Bonin et al. (2005a) found that 
foreign-owned banks appeared to be more cost efficient than the public- and 
privately-owned banks. The banks with majority foreign ownership are found to 
outperform the other types of banks in these countries. Study by Karim (2003) on 
Malaysian banks found similar results. 
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On the other hand, Okuda and Rungsomboon (2004) study on 27 commercial 
banks in Thailand from 1990 to 2002 found no significant differences in term of 
performance between the foreign and domestic banks in the Thailand banking system. 
The results is supported by Chantapong (2005). He found that  foreign banks appeared 
to be more efficient than domestic banks in terms of capitalization and lower levels of 
nonperforming loans but no significant  difference in cost efficiency.  
However, there are a couple of studies (Zaim, 1995 and Yildirim, 2002). that 
indicate state-own banks are efficient than the privately-owned and foreign-owned 
banks.   
 
5. Ownerships structure in ASEAN-5 banking industry 
 This section will reviews briefly the regulatory framework on ownership in 
the ASEAN-5 countries in general and their trends towards the government-owned 
and foreign-owned banks over the year 2001 to 2006.  
The financial system in Thailand is mainly dominated by the commercial 
banks, capital markets, government-owned specialized financial institutions and non-
bank financial intermediaries. Due to the Asian financial crisis in July 1997, the 
banking system had converted seven out of 15 commercial banks back to state-owned 
banks in order to help the country to gain control over the channel for monetary 
policy transmission.  
In addition to that, the authorities planned to sell the existing state-owned 
banks only in the medium term and long term because the needs for government 
intervention is crucial in order to build a stronger banking system after the effects of 
financial crisis (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). Nevertheless, the public-owned banks 
are being run on commercial lines in which they will sign MOUs with the Ministry of 
Finance and the banks’ board of directors. This is to create a performance orientation 
banks rather than solely depends on the government to safeguard their operations.  
The privatization process in Thailand is more cautious where it is stated that 
the foreign banks are allow to hold more than 25 percent of the domestic bank’s 
shares up to ten years and thereafter the foreign investors are not allow to take up any 
additional equity unless their equity share is below 49 percent. This was clearly 
illustrated by the data in Table 1 in which there was a decreasing trend in the number 
of foreign banks in Thailand after the financial crisis that is from 25 foreign banks in 
1999 to 18 foreign banks at the end of 2005. This might due to the reasons that the 
government needs to have more control over the domestic banking system in order to 
have a more effective implementation of monetary policy after the financial crisis. 
In Indonesia, due to the financial crisis, the country nationalized four banks in 
1998 and seven banks in 1999 as a result of the take over process by the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) due to the injections of public capital into the 
private banks. However, the owners of the banks are given the priority to keep 
managing the banks should inject 20 percent of new capital requirements after writing 
down their doubtful and bad loans and were given the first right to buy back the 
government shares within three years. In addition, the foreign banks also seem to 
exhibit a decrease in number after the Asian financial crisis and this had been clearly 
presented in Table 1.  
On the other hand, the Malaysian government came out with a special agency 
called Danamodal in order to recapitalize and strengthen the banking industry after 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The banking sector in Malaysia is more on 
privately-owned domestic commercial banks instead of wholly government-owned 
entity. Nevertheless, the entry requirement of the foreign banks is limited to equity 
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participation in local commercial or merchant banks with an aggregate share holding 
not more than 30 percent. Only the Labuan offshore financial institutions are allowed 
to have cross-border supply and consumption abroad.  
Whereas, in Singapore, the local banks retain at least half of the market and 
this had been accomplished even though Singapore appears to have more foreign 
banks operating in the country as compared to locally-owned banks.  
In the Philippines, the commercial banks are mostly family-owned in which 
the family corporate groups have large portion of corporate assets and have significant 
ownership in large commercial banks (Unite and Sullivan, 2002). However, the 
Philippines government had taken a step further to liberalize the banking industry by 
the implementation of Republic Act No. 7721 or “An act Liberalizing the Entry and 
Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines” as well as the enactment of 
various acts and policies issues to provide incentives for the foreign counterpart to 
enter into the banking industry. Thus, the numbers of foreign-owned banks started to 
increase since 1999 from 11 banks to 14 banks at the end of 2006. Nevertheless, the 
market share of foreign-majority owned banks shall not exceed 30 percent of the 
banking industry. This might be the reason of relatively low number of foreign-owned 
banks in the country as compared to others country in the ASEAN (refer Table 1).   
Liberalizing the market for foreign entry seems to be consistent with the 
theoretical views that the foreign banks will be able to boost the country economy and 
efficiency of the domestic-owned banks. This was supported by Unite and Sullivan 
(2002) in which they found that the foreign entry will have direct positive effects 
towards the domestic banking industry in the Philippines. Nevertheless, this only 
works for the banks that are able to respond to the competition from the foreign 
counterpart and thus, government control over the banking market is still needed in 
order to strengthen the domestic banking industry in order to compete with the foreign 
counterparts. 
In general, it can be seen from Table 1 that the numbers of banks seem to 
decline after the Asian financial crisis. This might be due to the merger and 
acquisition program going on in the recent years in most of the ASEAN-5 countries in 
order to strengthen up the banking industry before the banking market fully opens up  
for foreign entry. In addition to that, the numbers of foreign-owned banks also seems 
to decrease in numbers after the Asian financial crisis due to tight control of foreign 
entry into the market. Only the Philippines market seems to have increase in the 
number of foreign banks (Table 1).  
 
6. Implications for Banking Policy 
As pointed out by discussion in Section 3 and 4, it is clearly indicated that the 
types of ownerships did exert some influences towards the performance of the banks 
in terms of bank efficiency. di Patti and Hardy (2005) highlighted that changes in 
management and ownership are likely to change the banks’ productivity in general. In 
this context, it is shown that the impacts brought by state-owned banks are still 
inconclusive and thus more research need to be done in this area especially the 
comparison between the state-, private-, and foreign-owned banks in the developing 
countries. 
Even though government-owned banks operates in an economically inefficient 
environment, it is undeniable that the existence of government-owned banks are 
needed especially in the countries with less stable economies features. This is because 
the government-owned banks or the state-owned banks can act as a catalyst to ensure 
the development of certain priority sectors that are believed to contribute to the long 
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run economic growth of the countries. Besides that, the existence of state-owned 
banks and government-ownership is crucial for the countries to have a balance social 
and economic objective.  
Besides that, government-owned banks did play a vital role in carrying out the 
monetary and fiscal policies implemented by the government especially when come to 
redistribution of wealth and income in order to create a balance economy for the 
countries. Thus, the existence of government ownership in the banking sector will 
enable the government to have a more direct control over the monetary policies being 
implemented (Megginson (2002).  
Nevertheless, one cannot only focus on the economic development and 
forgoing the important for the banks to operate economically in terms of profit and 
cost in order to compete with the foreign counterparts as we are moving towards the 
world of globalization and liberalization. It would be an ideal situation if a country 
able to balance up the development between government-owned banks as well as 
privately-owned banks and  foreign-owned banks.  
This is because privatization is crucial in boosting the performance of banks as 
it will frees the government to subsidies to loss making of the state-owned enterprises 
and at the same time encourages the restructuring of unprofitable firms (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Therefore, policy makers would need to consider privatizing some 
of the government-owned banks in order to improve the financial performance of the 
bank in order to compete globally. This is supported by Boehmer et al. (2005) that 
highlighted those state-owned banks privatization was used to increase the financial 
performance of the countries with lower quality banking sectors. 
In addition, countries need to encourage the entry for foreign participants into 
the banking sectors in order to boost the economy of the country. This is because 
foreign-ownership enables the banks to improve the quality and availability of the 
financial services towards the domestic financial market (Levine, 1996). Besides that, 
it will encourage the domestic banks to compete more efficiently in terms of costs and 
profits in order to survive in this environment. The spillover effects in terms of 
technology brought by the foreign participant will enable the creation of a more 
modern banking environment in the host countries.  
Furthermore, with a balance combination of state-, privately-, and foreign-
owned banks, it is believed that the banking industry in the developing countries will 
be able to survive in the competitive environment while helping the government to 
effectively implement macroeconomics policies in the long run. Therefore, it is 
suggested that state-owned banks still have it value for existence in terms of economic 
development especially in the developing countries, provided efficient allocation of 
resources, besides promoting privately-owned banks to ensure competition in the 
banking sector.  
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Table 1: Domestic Banks and Foreign-Owned Commercial Banks in ASEAN-5 
 
Country Thailand Indonesia Singapore Malaysia Philippines 
Year 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
1997 14 21 178 44 12 140 22 13 37 17 
1998 12 23 164 44 12 142 27 8 38 12 
1999 9 25 124 40 9 133 20 13 41 11 
2000 9 25 112 39 8 132 17 14 32 13 
2001 9 22 111 34 8 125 11 14 31 13 
2002 13 18 108 34 6 114 11 13 28 14 
2003 13 18 107 31 5 112 10 13 28 14 
2004 12 18 103 31 5 110 10 13 28 14 
2005 16 18 102 29 5 106 10 13 28 14 
2006 N/A N/A 102 28 5 103 10 12 28 14 
*Note: Domestic banks include all the state-owned banks and privately-owned banks 
Sources: Central Banks Annual Reports from individual country
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